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Dauphin. But his conversation, his appearance, his manners, all preclude the idea that the prisoner whom Lasne and Gomin attended from November, 1794, to the 8th of June, 1795, was any other than Louis Charles of France and of Bourbon, then the only son of Louis XVI.

The conclusion, therefore, to which, in common, we doubt not, with every intelligent and impartial observer, we must inevitably come, is, that there is not one syllable of truth in all the stories of all the Dauphins. In saying this, we do not desire to impeach the good faith of the last of this tribe. We have no reason to suppose Mr. Williams does not devoutly believe in the truth of his own pretensions. He is, probably, the victim of a hallucination harmless in itself, and perhaps productive of some satisfaction to its subject. If this be the case, we are content to leave him in the full enjoyment of all the supposititious honors that attend his barren heritage, and venture to assure him that no one more readily than ourselves will welcome the appearance of proof sufficient to induce us to alter our present convictions.

ART. VI. — *History of Greece.* By GEORGE GROTE, Esq.
London: John Murray. New York: Harpers. (Vols. I. — XI.)

DURING the past century, the history of antiquity has been investigated with a zeal before unknown. Men have become aware that such investigation is not merely a dull research among the mouldering bones of a lifeless past, but an inquiry full of interest and advantage to the more important present. As the idea of political liberty is more widely diffused, and acquires every day new force and energy, the histories of the ancient republics, Athens and Rome, assume an especial interest. We need them, both as a warning and as an encouragement. They have, however, been presented to us too exclusively in the former light. Especially has the dark side of Athenian liberty been held up by able historians, to exhibit

the rashness of the people and the ingratitude of republics, while the brighter and more pleasing side has been left to be profaned and rendered odious by unprincipled demagogues, who may have found it available, as in the French Revolution, to swell the flame of popular fury.

It is this brighter side of Athenian liberty which Mr. Grote has endeavored to present, and to clothe with the dignity of history. He has ventured to retouch with a new purpose some of the lines which still remain as they were originally drawn by the comic pen of Aristophanes, and as they have been reflected by hundreds of succeeding historians. Mr. Grote is peculiarly well fitted for the task. In his threefold experience, as a man of business, a politician, and a scholar, he has acquired a more enlarged view of history and historical criticism than the mere scholar can usually attain. The volumes before us are particularly valuable as coming from the pen of an Englishman. Instead of drawing, like too many of his countrymen, an illiberal conservatism from his mother earth, Mr. Grote seems to have imbibed a truly liberal spirit, which never yet was wholly extinguished in the English mind, however much it may have been smothered by prejudice.

There are some who deny, not only to Englishmen, but to any one at the present day, the power of reproducing the history of Greece. "Our modern histories," it has been well said, "are in great measure a series of essays," hardly belonging to the same species with the history of Thucydides. We must consider, as Mr. Grote has said, that "our knowledge of the ancient world is only what has drifted ashore from the wreck of a stranded vessel"; and the wonder should be, not that we present it so imperfectly, but that we are able to reproduce it at all.

One of the leading characteristics of Mr. Grote's work is his view of the early myths, "the Grecian foretime." The beautiful background of poetry and legend from which flows, almost imperceptibly, the pure stream of Grecian history, in which the religion of Greece took its rise, and in which the gods and the sons of gods walked among men, has usually been regarded by historians as furnishing at least the frame-

work of an authentic history of that early period. By the simple process of stripping the demigods and heroes of all that made them more than men, by rationalizing some miracles into highly colored statements of plain, every-day facts, and explaining others as later additions to accounts originally of perfect credibility, the Heroic Age has been reduced to a very tame and commonplace reality, remarkable only for its barrenness. Every individual and every incident, which could possibly inspire awe or awaken interest, have been carefully sifted out; the chaff has been preserved as the basis of history, while the more valuable myths, so important in the history of the Hellenic mind, have been suffered to lie neglected, or to occupy a place in the catalogue of heathen superstitions. We may, for example, find in the preface of Thucydides what would be called the "historic basis" of the Trojan war of the *Iliad*; and we may see the effect of the rationalizing process upon Herodotus, when we find him yielding to the arguments of the Egyptian priests so far as to accept the war of Troy in its general details, with the great exception that Helen was not present in the city, but remained in the hands of King Proteus during the ten years' siege, and at last was carried ingloriously back to Sparta by her victorious husband. Thucydides is even more unsparing in his treatment of the legend. He does not hesitate to give his opinion that the Trojan war was a private expedition of Agamemnon, the various princes engaging in it rather in obedience to the king of men, than as disappointed suitors of Helen, bound by the oath imposed by Tyndarus. The Helen of the historians, we must also remember, is no daughter of Zeus, but the child of a human father, and displaying only human charms.

It was with no such scenes as these that the poets and their true followers filled up the "divine foretime" of the Heroic Age. The ages of gold, silver, and brass had not given place directly to that of iron; but the earth had been visited by a fourth, an heroic race, before it was given up at last to frail humanity and the degenerate offspring of the iron age. This divine race of heroes had fought under the walls of Thebes and Troy. Their divine descent, their gigantic strength, their miraculous exploits, were as much realities to the faith of an

unphilosophic age, as were their names or their existence. Divested of their miraculous attributes, they would have appeared as strangers to the very poets whose lives were spent in celebrating their exploits; they could have claimed no place in tradition, and none of their proud posterity would have recognized in them the superhuman ancestors whom they had been taught to venerate. And yet these heroes existed only on the authority of these very poets and these very traditions. Can we be justified in setting aside the only form in which they appeared to those who believed in them, and substituting in its place some interpretation given by later historians, or perhaps some plausible idea of our own? This is the point upon which Mr. Grote comes to an issue with his predecessors.

“We are not warranted in applying to the mythical world the rules either of historical credibility or chronological sequence. Its personages are gods, heroes, and men, in constant juxtaposition and reciprocal sympathy; men, too, of whom we know a large proportion to be fictitious, and of whom we can never ascertain how many have been real. The myths were originally produced in an age which had no records, no philosophy, no criticism, no canon of belief, and scarcely any tincture of astronomy or geography,—but which, on the other hand, was full of religious faith, distinguished for quick and susceptible imagination, seeing personal agents where we look only for objects and connecting laws;—an age, moreover, eager for new narrative, accepting with the unconscious impressibility of children (the question of truth or falsehood being never formally raised) all which ran in harmony with its preëxisting feeling, and penetrable by inspired prophets and poets in the same proportion that it was indifferent to positive evidence. To such hearers did the primitive poet or storyteller address himself; it was the glory of his productive genius to provide suitable narrative expression for the faith and emotion which he shared in common with them, and the rich stock of Grecian myths attests how admirably he performed his task. As the gods and the heroes formed the conspicuous objects of national reverence, so the myths were partly divine, partly heroic, partly both in one. The adventures of Achilles, Helen, and Diomedes, of Œdipus and Adrastus, of Meleager and Althæa, of Jason and the Argo, were recounted by the same tongues, and accepted with the same unsuspecting confidence, as those of Apollo and Artemis, of Ares and Aphrodite, of Poseidon and Herakles.

“The time, however, came, when this plausibility ceased to be complete. The Grecian mind made an important advance, socially, ethically, and intellectually. Philosophy and history were constituted, prose writing and chronological records became familiar; a canon of belief more or less critical came to be tacitly recognized. . . . Into the new intellectual medium, thus altered in its elements and no longer uniform in its quality, the myths descended by inheritance; but they were found, to a certain extent, out of harmony even with the feelings of the people, and altogether dissonant with those of instructed men. But the most superior Greek was still a Greek, and cherished the common reverential sentiment towards the foretime of his country. Though he could neither believe nor respect the myths as they then stood, he was under an imperious mental necessity to transform them into a state worthy of his belief and respect. While the literal myth still continued to float among the poets and the people, critical men interpreted, altered, decomposed, and added, until they found something that satisfied their minds as a supposed real basis. They manufactured some dogmas of supposed original philosophy, and a long series of fancied history and chronology, retaining the mythical names and generations even when they were obliged to discard or recast the mythical events. The interpreted myth was thus promoted into a reality, while the literal myth was degraded into a fiction.” — Vol. I. pp. 604, 605.

The preceding extracts contain a general statement of Mr. Grote's theory of the Grecian myths. It will be seen that he recognizes a mythopœic age; an age of poetry, when the primitive uncritical faith would accept whatever the poet might offer, to fill the shadowy background of the past with objects of veneration. It was an age of *faith*; the age of *belief* and the age of scepticism (which begin together) had not yet arrived.

It must be borne in mind, that Mr. Grote does not absolutely deny the existence of any historical basis to all the Grecian myths. It is simply his aim to show that myths without foundation were often created by the imagination of the bard, and accepted by the faith of the hearer. This is a point not sufficiently noticed by those who oppose Mr. Grote's theory. Nothing could be more natural, than that many historical facts, so prominent as to be held in the memory of many generations, should be selected by the poet as appropriate objects upon which to exercise his mythopœic faculty.

This may have happened even in the majority of cases; that is to say, *we* know nothing to the contrary; the great and only trouble in the question is, to determine how much of the whole mass of mythical and poetical legend has clustered around a point of real history, and then to ascertain what that point of history is in itself. This, in most cases, is absolutely impossible, unless we can obtain information in regard to early Grecian history from sources not at present accessible, and not open to the earlier historians of Greece itself. In speaking of the amended, rationalized version of the Trojan war given by Thucydides, Mr. Grote says:—

“Historical truth it would doubtless have been, if any independent evidence could have been found to sustain it. Had Thucydides been able to produce such new testimony, we should have been pleased to satisfy ourselves that the war of Troy, as he recounted it, was the real event; of which the war of Troy, as sung by the epic poets, was a misrepresented, exaggerated, and ornamented recital. But in this case, the poets are the only real witnesses, and the narrative of Thucydides is a mere extract and distillation from their incredibilities.”

The only course open, then, and the one which Mr. Grote has adopted, is to relate the myths as they were related to the Greeks themselves, and as they appeared to the eye of primitive faith. They must not be neglected, as they form an important chapter in the history of Grecian development. If they are simply related, with all their charm of poetry and romance, they present the Grecian foretime in the only manner in which it appeared to the Greeks themselves, while every one is at liberty to discover or imagine any traces that he can of an historical basis. Any such point of history, however, which may be discovered or imagined in the legend, must not be considered as investing with credibility even the plausible circumstances associated with it by the poets, still less as supplying an historical or even an allegorical foundation to the various legends which time has collected around it. It must only be considered as the point around which, perhaps accidentally, the mythopœic age has collected its legends, directed to one grand centre of interest. The war of Troy, for example, seems to us an actual fact, in its general statement,

“Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello”;

but it is not upon the authority (strictly speaking) of Homer, Thucydides, or Herodotus, that we accept it, nor should we consider any one guilty of unwarrantable scepticism, or of disrespect to the ancient writers, who should deny its existence altogether. We accept it simply because we believe that such a clustering of myths, both divine and heroic, around a single point, such a concentration of interest, transferred from the world below to the immortals on Olympus, must have been *directed in its course* by some memorable collision between Europe and Asia, which would awaken a more intense and more continued interest than any mere creation of the poet's imagination could excite. We do not intend to abandon Mr. Grote's principle, or to make any exception to it in favor of the Trojan war. We consider the testimony of Homer *to the fact*, as of no more value than his evidence in regard to the councils of Olympus, or the rearing of the god of war. And if any one thinks it more probable that Homer and the cyclic poets adapted their rhapsodies to a purely imaginary war, rather than to one of the many actual conflicts which must have been known to them by the traditions of the past, he differs from us on a question only of probability, not of theory. To accept some actual fact, not as an historical basis of the myths of Troy, but as a point of direction by which its formation was guided, seems to us the more probable of two plausible probabilities.

A cry is often raised against the mythical theory, on the ground that it destroys all the early history of antiquity. This is the cry which assailed Niebuhr, and which those who follow in his path need not fear to meet. Instead of destroying the early Roman history, Niebuhr was the first to inspire it with life and reality, — the first to enable us to behold, through the fables and legends of the kings and the early commonwealth, the gradual formation of the Roman constitution. Mr. Grote has followed his great predecessor in most of his principles of historical criticism, while in other respects he has adopted a somewhat different course. He rarely, if ever, admits allegory into his interpretation of the Grecian myths, excluding in his later edition many traces which appeared in

the former. Niebuhr, on the other hand, is often inclined to allegorize the Roman legends, even where he despairs of finding a literal historic basis. He suggests that Remus leaping over his brother's wall may be a "personification of the plebs leaping across the ditch from the side of the Aventine"; the contest of the Horatii and the Curiatii indicates, he says, that Rome and Alba were each divided into three tribes, while the statement that they were the sons of two sisters, and all born on the same day, "contains a suggestion of a perfect equality" between the two states.* We need not state what criticism Mr. Grote would make upon these suggestions. On the other hand, we shall find instances, when we come to the more authentic history of Greece, where our historian even retreats from points of scepticism maintained by Niebuhr.

After the early history of Rome had been placed in its true light by Niebuhr, the effect of his criticism was felt in all investigations of ancient history. His own researches into Greek history, to which much of his earlier labor was devoted, and the results of which are preserved in his Lectures, opened the way to more enlightened views and a more philosophical criticism. The early Hellenic world, however, possesses one advantage over the Roman as a field for investigation, where it has often been supposed to labor under peculiar difficulties. In regard to the early ages of Greece, we are sometimes told, we have only poems and acknowledged legends to rely upon, while Roman history from the earliest times has been transmitted to us on the high authority of Livy. If this were so, Rome might well claim the advantage; but since Niebuhr has shown us that the fancied early history of Livy is mostly rationalized from a body of ancient poetry, afterwards forgotten or ignored, we find the advantage belongs wholly to the other side. Here we have the Grecian epic, preserved to us in two immortal specimens, bearing witness of others without number, which have not survived the hand of time. If these had all perished, and we possessed merely the rationalized "historic basis" found in the historians, then would the two

* *Lectures on Roman History*, Vol. I. pp. 43, 45.

cases of Greece and Rome appear on the same ground. The first book of Livy has always appeared plausible, because it presents, to a common observer, no appearance of having existed in a poetical form. But if we could obtain the history of Livy's predecessor, Fabius Pictor, and also the poetical lays and legends upon which that early work was mainly founded, we could then criticize Livy upon the same principles by which Herodotus and Thucydides are now criticized by the aid of Homer. This Niebuhr could do. He could reconstruct Fabius Pictor to his mind's eye; he could read even in Livy the extracts from the Roman epics, and could tell us their names, while he quoted their very verses. We possess, then, in the case of Greece, the accounts of later historians accompanied by their original authorities, so that we can judge by the latter how much credit is due to the former; in the case of Rome, we have simply the accounts of the historians, apparently relying upon some authentic basis, but really depending upon the same support of poetical legend as those of Greece. In the case of Greece, then, there is less room for deception, even though her legends were afterwards interpreted into facts by her historians, as we may always appeal from the historian to his original authority.

Mr Grote begins his account of "Historical Greece" with the first Olympiad, B. C. 776. This date he selects as being the earliest point to which any system of chronology can be traced. As there are many events below this date which partake largely of the mythical, so there are others previous to it which must be included in authentic history. The first individual whom Mr. Grote admits upon his stage, *as a man*, is the great Spartan lawgiver, Lycurgus. In his sixth chapter, he gives a brief account of the institutions of Sparta usually ascribed to Lycurgus, valiantly fighting his way through the mass of fable that surrounds the lawgiver, and striving to gain a sight of the great man himself, the first he has found since he began his history with Zeus on Olympus. Our account of Lycurgus, as is well known, depends almost entirely on the authority of Plutarch, whose historical accuracy never could be called his greatest virtue. Among the innovations introduced by Lycurgus, the redivision of the lands of Sparta and

Laconia among the Spartans and the Periceci has usually maintained its ground in history as a well-authenticated anomaly. This is a piece of ancient Socialism which we have always regretted, and we have only consoled ourselves by remembering that the scheme proved utterly abortive, and of little authority as a precedent. Mr. Grote removes the difficulty by denying the reality of any such institution of Lycurgus. He says:—

“Now we shall find on consideration that this new and equal partition of land by Lycurgus is still more at variance with fact and probability than the two former alleged proceedings. All the historical evidences exhibit decided inequalities of property among the Spartans,—inequalities which tended constantly to increase; moreover, the earliest authors do not conceive this evil as having grown up by way of abuse out of a primeval system of perfect equality, *nor do they know any thing of the original equal redivision by Lycurgus.*” — Vol. II. p. 530.

In support of this last statement he cites various passages from Hellanicus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Plato, showing that these writers recognized no division of the Spartan land subsequent to that made at the time of the Doric conquest.

“Lastly,” he says, “Aristotle clearly did not believe that Lycurgus had redivided the soil. For he informs us, first, that, ‘both in Lacedæmon and in Krete, the legislator had rendered the enjoyment of property common through the establishment of the Syssitia or public mess.’ Now this remark (if read in the chapter of which it forms part, a refutation of the scheme of Communism for the select guardians in the Platonic Republic) will be seen to tell little for its point, if we assume that Lycurgus at the same time equalized all individual possessions. Had Aristotle known the fact, he could not have failed to notice it; nor could he have assimilated the legislators in Lacedæmon and Krete, seeing that in the latter no one pretends that any such equalization was ever brought about.

“It appears, then, that none of the authors down to Aristotle ascribe to Lycurgus a redivision of the lands, either of Sparta or Laconia.”

The silence of so many writers, to say nothing of their positive testimony, is certainly an important consideration against accepting so remarkable a statement on authority so late as that of Plutarch. It seems evident that the story first be-

came generally known between the time of Aristotle and that of Plutarch. It is hardly credible that, during that period of literary inactivity in Greece, any such important fact in Spartan history should have been rescued from the oblivion of so many centuries. Our only alternative seems to be, to reject the story, as a fiction which had become current in the later centuries before Christ, and which was accepted by Plutarch as authentic history. If we wish to proceed further, and ascertain the foundation of the story in Plutarch, we have a large field open for speculation and conjecture. Mr. Grote, partially supported by Lachmann, ascribes the idea to the circumstances existing in the reign of Agis III. and Cleomenes III., and especially to the famous dream of Agis, related in Plutarch. We would refer those interested in the question, and in the whole subject of Lycurgus, to Mr. Grote's sixth chapter in his second volume.

In the third volume, we have a fine delineation of Solon, as a poet, as a lawgiver, and as a man. The mark which he made upon his age was no transient impression; it has survived the race who first received it, and, transmitted through the ages of Rome's rise and decline, is still felt in its effect on the jurisprudence of Modern Europe. The character of such a man can never be presented to the world in too brilliant a light. His life should be studied wherever stern integrity and unwavering patriotism are honored, and his warning voice against approaching despotism, though addressed to Athens in vain, should never be suffered to be silent. Mr. Grote has done full justice to the subject. His description of the Solonian constitution is full and clear, and nothing is omitted which could tend to give a vivid impression of this portion of Athenian history. The alleged interview between Solon and Cræsus at Sardis he rejects, as irreconcilable with chronology, and he proposes the following explanation of the narrative in Herodotus.

“In my judgment, this is an illustrative tale, in which certain real characters, — Cræsus and Solon, — and certain real facts, — the great power and succeeding ruin of the former by the victorious arm of Cyrus, — together with certain facts probably altogether fictitious, such as the two sons of Cræsus, the Phrygian Adrastus and his history, the

hunting of the mischievous wild boar on Mount Olympus, the ultimate preservation of Cræsus, &c., are put together so as to convey an impressive moral lesson." — Vol II. p. 200, *note*.

He adds:—

"But even if no chronological objections existed, the moral purpose of the tale is so prominent, and pervades it so systematically from beginning to end, that these internal grounds are of themselves sufficiently strong to impeach its credibility as a matter of fact, unless such doubts happen to be outweighed—which in this case they are not—by good contemporary testimony. The narrative of Solon and Cræsus can be taken for nothing else but an illustrative fiction, borrowed by Herodotus from some philosopher, and clothed in his own peculiar beauty of expression, which on this occasion is more decidedly poetical than is habitual with him."

We quote these passages as an instance where Mr. Grote strives to detect a dramatic element in Herodotus. Many other striking instances occur, such as the dream of Xerxes, and the conversations with Demaratus, where a similar tendency seems to be visible. But it seems unnecessary to imagine for these any different origin from that which is universally conceded to the whole class of speeches both in Herodotus and Thucydides. In all cases, the historian seems to have accepted as a fact the occasion which called forth the speech or the conversation, and then to have supplied the words, as the case may have been, from recollection, from hearsay, or tradition, or, where these failed, from imagination. There seems hardly sufficient evidence to convince us that either historian ever manufactured the occasion as well as the speech, for dramatic effect. Those, however, who would exclude the exercise of the imagination wholly from the speeches of Thucydides, must be referred to Mr. Grote's remark, on the dialogue in the fifth book of Thucydides between the Athenian embassy and the oligarchy of Melos (Vol. VII. p. 157). Even if we do not agree with him so far as to consider this a dramatic fragment, entitled to the name of *Μῆλον Ἀλωσις*, in parody of the title of the last tragedy of Phrynicus, yet we must acknowledge the evidence of a dramatic design in the historian, in expressing the atrocious sentiments of the Athenian envoy in such vivid language, in antithesis to the overwhelming disaster

and ruin of Athens upon which he is about to enter. These alternate questions and answers must have been drawn principally from the imagination of the historian; for none of the Melian oligarchy could have escaped the final massacre, to report the controversy which preceded, and surely no Athenian, who had either uttered such sentiments or suffered them to be uttered in his name, would have been anxious to repeat them, and certainly not when coupled with the Melian replies, as they stand in Thucydides.

We must hasten with a mere glance over the interesting chapters containing the administration of the Pisistratidæ, the reforms of Cleisthenes, the Ionic revolt, and the Persian wars. We have several ample chapters devoted to the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, Italy, and Sicily, and to the various nations with whom the Hellenic race came in contact by migration or by war. We are glad to find that, as we advance into the historical period, Mr. Grote follows Herodotus with almost unwavering fidelity. It was once the fashion to decry this writer, as little better than a fabulist, and his venerable title of "father of history" has sometimes even been changed to that of "father of lies." This unscrupulous, ignorant libel is now almost forgotten, and it is perhaps unpardonable in us to recall it from its oblivion. Every year's investigation adds new weight to the authority of Herodotus; and even the statements which were once thought to be the strongest proofs of his credulity and extravagance, have now become the most convincing evidence of his scrupulous veracity. The world may now safely be challenged to produce a single statement, made by Herodotus *upon his own authority*, and where he had the means of forming an opinion, which can be proved to be false. We could hardly ask more even for Thucydides.

We are glad to see that Mr. Grote has even accepted some points, on the authority of Herodotus, which Niebuhr thought it necessary to reject. One instance of this may be seen in regard to the battle of Marathon. Niebuhr says of the narrative in Herodotus, "The particulars of the battle are uncertain; most of them resemble the well-known deed of Cynegirus, who madly seized a Persian galley and wanted to hold it back. All this is poetical, and may serve to rejoice and warm

us, but we cannot take it as history." * Mr. Grote, however, less suspicious of Herodotus, and more in the spirit of modern criticism on that historian, accepts even the story of Cynegirus, which certainly has in it nothing impossible, and which might have been related upon the best authority, as the hero was a well-known man, and a brother of the poet Æschylus.

"His [Herodotus's] account of the battle of Marathon presents him in honorable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him; for though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies; and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account, — because it is a little, — showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities." — Vol. IV. p. 469.

It must be remembered, however, that the large numbers usually associated with the battle of Marathon, and which Niebuhr considers too large for the plain to hold, are not taken from Herodotus, but from later historians.

To give another instance, Mr. Grote says: —

"The canal dug by order of Xerxes across the promontory of Mount Athos, and the sailing of the Persian fleet through it, is a fact which I believe, because it is well attested, — notwithstanding its remarkable improbability, which so far misled Juvenal as to induce him to single out the narrative as a glaring example of Grecian mendacity." — Vol. I. p. 575.

Niebuhr, on the other hand, after saying that "history is here so interwoven with poetry, that they can no longer be separated," adds: "But Mount Athos assuredly was not cut through; it seems inconceivable why he should have done so, although the Greeks themselves state that even in later times traces were visible near Sane." Mr. Grote has in this case, as an authority in support of himself and Herodotus, the researches of Colonel Leake, who found even at this day evident traces of the great canal of Xerxes on the isthmus of Mount Athos. He even suggests the possibility of reopening the passage, and as an evidence of its advantage, and of the danger of circumnavigating the promontory, he states that he found

* *Lectures*, Vol. I. p. 327.

it impossible to persuade a boatman to carry him from the eastern side to the western, even by offering a high price. This is only one of the many instances in which modern research has established the authority of the "father of history."

The period from the expulsion of the Persians to the Peloponnesian war is one of peculiar interest, and is of especial importance in our author's work. He is avowedly an advocate of the Athenian democracy, and strives in every way to defend it against the various misrepresentations to which it has been subject. He does not accept Aristophanes's picture of the waspish old man Demus, of Pnyx, and he endeavors to show the other side of his friend's character, which the satirist never notices. Like his modern successor, John Bull, the old man held certain possessions beyond the sea, acquired in a way sometimes considered of doubtful morality, and whose treatment often excited scandal among his meddlesome neighbors. As it is all important to begin with a strong foundation, Mr. Grote endeavors at the outset to justify the position of imperial Athens during the time of her maritime empire, previous to its dissolution by means of the Peloponnesian war. He draws an important distinction, often overlooked, between Athens as president of the confederacy of Delos, and imperial Athens at the head of a number of *subject* islands and states. The confederacy of Delos was formed no less for the benefit of the allies than for that of Athens, to maintain a common war against a common enemy. The quota of ships and men which each state was to furnish was apportioned by the just Aristides, and the purpose for which they had associated was completely answered. The independence of the numerous islands in the Ægean was secured and maintained by their alliance, and by the dignity and power of the presiding city. During this period of *hegemony*, no greater dissatisfaction existed in the confederacy than is usual in such associations for mutual benefit. But an important change had taken place in the mean time. As the more imminent danger of attack diminished, and as the confederacy became employed more and more in offensive operations, the more indolent islanders were soon glad to compound with the active Athenians to supply the whole number of ships and men, on condition of

receiving an annual contribution in money. This arrangement was equally agreeable to both parties; to the smaller states, as it enabled them to enjoy all the security afforded by the protection of Athens, without exposing their persons to actual danger; and to Athens, as it gave her a more exclusive control of the confederacy, and enabled her to establish her own power on a solid and permanent foundation. The whole system was still voluntary. The periodical synods at Delos were still continued, and the position of Athens was considered changed only by those who saw the ultimate result of the blind policy of the confederates.

Down to the time of the revolt of Naxos, in 466 B. C., we have no evidence of any violent dissatisfaction or complaint against Athens, greater than was to be expected among states thus associated by mutual consent. When this first violent breach of harmony took place, a new aspect of the case was presented. The confederacy had been formed for a specific object, and that object still continued to be carried out in the manner selected by the large majority of the confederates. It was plainly the duty which the presiding city owed both to herself and to the other allies, to coerce the unwilling members into obedience. If ever there could be a case where the power intrusted to Athens could be justly exercised, it was when a state which had been enjoying the protection of the confederacy refused to contribute its stipulated amount to the common support. The revolt of Naxos was the first instance of a kind of nullification, which it was highly dangerous for the confederacy to countenance or overlook. The example of revolt was, however, contagious. Associated action was opposed to one of the first principles of the Hellenic mind, which was inclined to carry the idea of independence even to an absurdity; and under the peace and prosperity secured by the alliance, they were likely to value less the advantages which they gained by it, and to grudge the contributions by which it was maintained. It was these successive revolts, followed by subjection, which gradually changed the Athenian *hegemony* into the Athenian empire. No particular step could be blamed,—each was probably taken with great reluctance; but the result was the cause of the excessive unpopularity, and at last of the

ruin, of Athens. At the time of the thirty years' truce (B. C. 445), the only allies remaining upon the old footing of equality with Athens were Chios, Lesbos, and Samos. All the others had at some time revolted, and had been reduced to the condition of subjects. A tribute was imposed upon the subject states, and every precaution was taken against future revolt.

This is the view which Mr. Grote has taken of the gradual formation of the Athenian empire. He is far from defending all the proceedings of Athens in regard to her subjects, after they were acquired, much less the cruelties inflicted, on various occasions, during the Peloponnesian war. It is principally in the acquisition of her power that he would defend her, and here we think he is successful.

"But though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered, and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable causes; voluntary invitation, efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy, unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty, and inability to break up the confederacy without endangering themselves, as well as laying open the Ægean Sea to the Persians." — Vol. V. p. 504.

This view is in accordance with the brief narrative in Thucydides, who clearly marks the distinction observed by Mr. Grote between the two periods of Athenian supremacy. The presiding character assumed in the time of Aristides was totally different from the imperial character assumed under Pericles. The latter statesman discarded all ideas of a return to the ancient equality. His doctrine upon the subject, according to Mr. Grote, was this : —

"He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters. This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and, provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or institute control. That it was faithfully discharged, no one could deny. No ship of war, except that of Athens and her allies, was ever seen between the eastern and the western shores of the Ægean." — Vol. VI. p. 5.

This doctrine of Pericles was extremely popular with the

people ; the idea of " a despot city," however odious was its name among other states of Greece, was conceived by the Athenians without repugnance, and their pride was flattered by the appellation. As long as the great statesman, its life and soul, remained to guide it in its difficult course, it continued well worthy of the pride which it awakened. When his directing hand was removed, none of the smaller race who aspired to its control could preserve it from disastrous shipwreck.

In an account of the Peloponnesian war, under the positive guidance of Thucydides, there is little room for historical discussion as to matters of fact. It is especially in this department of his work that Mr. Grote has shown himself, not merely acquainted with the substance of his Greek authorities, but eminently able to criticize the language and construction of perhaps the most difficult among them. In the notes to his sixth and seventh volumes, materials might almost be collected for a new edition of Thucydides, which, although they aid in swelling the work to an unprecedented size, must yet be regarded as valuable contributions towards an interpretation of that historian. He is, however, not above correction, and is ever ready to abandon his erroneous opinions in deference to those who have distinguished themselves in classical learning, although he can often maintain his own ground with the ablest of them. We cannot help noticing his courteous reply to the criticisms of Mr. Scott upon his interpretations of Thucydides, and also his cool and dignified rejoinder to the insolent pamphlet of Mr. Shiletto, who seemed to consider Mr. Grote's classical criticism as a daring trespass of an outsider upon some private property of the University of Cambridge.

We now come to a more unpleasant subject, the leatherdresser Cleon. We had always supposed that, from Thucydides until the book of history should be closed, no two opinions were possible concerning this offspring of the Athenian democracy. But now we find Mr. Grote, in a long and elaborate panegyric, soberly endeavoring to prove that our opinions are all to be recast, and that Cleon is really the great man of his age. Even those who cannot fully agree with Mr. Grote in

his estimate of Cleon, must admit that he has succeeded in exhibiting a new side of his character, and in showing reasons why we should at least suspend our judgment upon some points of the evidence that we have. It must be allowed that our ideas of Cleon are mostly derived from two authors who had good reason to be prejudiced against him, and one of whom would not have hesitated to make his prejudice severely felt in comedy. Aristophanes did not spare even Socrates. He could not be expected to spare Cleon. Cleon might have been the best man in the world, and yet have appeared in comedy as he is represented in "The Knights." As to Thucydides, Mr. Grote says:—

"I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydides, that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is probably not without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgment which I have just been criticizing, I nevertheless look upon that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydides, but as common to him with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens." — Vol. VI. p. 476.

It is, of course, *primâ facie* evidence against a theory, that it is opposed to Thucydides on a question of fact. But we may be more liberal in our ideas of Cleon, and especially we may amply acknowledge his ability, without denying any actual statement of fact in the great historian, or impugning his impartiality. We cannot accuse a historian of partiality merely because we form a different opinion from him in regard to the same facts. Mr. Grote himself says:—

"The general attributes set forth by Thucydides, (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history,) we may well accept, — the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, *often dishonest*, — together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly, and trying to take a leading part in it against persons of greater family pretensions than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. . . . Unhappily, we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon.

We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Æschines, seventy years afterwards, each of these eminent orators imputing to each other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish." — Vol. VI. p. 332.

We may accept this statement, and yet maintain the impartiality of Thucydides.

Cleon seems to have been an unusually developed specimen of that class of men who are always found, in a republic, among the favorites of the populace. They have suddenly left their trades at some fancied call of the public good, and they possess no more elegance and courtesy than they brought with them from the tan-yard. Like Cleon, they "smell of the leather" wherever they appear. There is always a large amount of public fault-finding and accusation, very necessary to be performed, with which well-bred politicians are not anxious to soil their mouths. This class of patriots, with the best intentions in the world, stand always ready to undertake such business, and they are loudly applauded by the populace, who are equally interested in exposing petty corruption and injustice. Scenes of factious contention, such as they always produce, are what their nature craves, and therefore they cannot be expected to avoid or prevent them. They become excited and embittered in attacking abuses, and at last they deem every thing an abuse which their opponents honor and respect. They must be men of ability, for otherwise they could never have gained their power over the popular mind. Cleon, according to Thucydides, was at the same time "the most violent of the citizens," and "the most influential with the populace."

It is, indeed, against Aristophanes, more than against Thucydides, that Mr. Grote attempts to defend Cleon. He is willing to accept the "general attributes" set forth by the historian, and he merely supposes that Thucydides was prejudiced in his opinion of facts which he has related with faithful accuracy. We all know how much the wisest and the most impartial in our own day may be influenced in their

view of the notions of a violent popular leader by private animosity excited by some personal attack. The great point of which the experience of our own day should convince us is, that such demagogues usually act from the best of motives, with the best intentions; that their extravagances arise from their excitement and their mistaken notions of public interest, while their want of courtesy may be traced to the fact, that their code of politeness contains but few principles, and those peculiar to themselves.

Mr. Grote's remarks upon the affairs of Cleon and the Spartans in Sphacteria seem just, and consistent with the *facts* stated in Thucydides. Demosthenes had sent home for reinforcements at a time when the Athenians were confident that the siege was terminated, and that the enemy were in their power. Full of this hope, they had recently dismissed with insult the Lacedæmonian embassy which came with proposals of peace and alliance. Cleon, who had been foremost in rejecting the offer, was now especially forward in condemning the conduct of the war and the delay in capturing the island. He gave his opinion freely as to what might have been done, "if the generals had been *men*," (at the same time giving a significant look at Nicias, who was present,) and concluded with a declaration of what he himself would have done, if he had been general. Nicias offers to resign his own place to him; thinking it a joke, Cleon accepts, but at last, finding that he is held to his promise, he tries to escape, telling Nicias very properly, "It is your place to sail; you are the general, not I." As he cannot avoid accepting, his friends urging it in good faith, and his enemies insisting upon it, in the hope of ruining him by failure or of getting rid of him by death, he makes the best of the matter, and promises to return with the garrison as prisoners, or to leave them dead in Sphacteria, within twenty days. The affair ended, as is well known, by the appearance of Cleon and Demosthenes within the time specified, accompanied by 292 Lacedæmonian prisoners, including 120 full-blooded Spartans. This is usually considered as a famous farce; but if it be so, the most ridiculous characters in it (as Mr. Grote observes) are Nicias and the enemies of Cleon, who urged him, though an incompetent

man in their estimation, to undertake such an important enterprise.

“If we intend fairly to compare the behaviour of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner, &c. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely, or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphacteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to insure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries (Nicias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party opportunity for ruining him.” — Vol. VI. p. 459.

“Though the military attack of Sphacteria — one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the dexterous employment of different descriptions of troops than by care to spare the lives of the assailants — belongs wholly to Demosthenes; yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydides, Demosthenes would never have been reinforced, nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise, therefore, belongs jointly to both; and Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenes, (as Aristophanes represents him in the *Knights*,) was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them.” — Vol. VI. p. 476.

Although the character of Cleon is one for which we can feel little admiration or sympathy, it yet seems to have been open, and for the most part honest. Though his natural rudeness and strong popular principles made him odious to the refined and the conservative, his ability and eloquence rendered him a favorite with the large majority of citizens. Even his enemy Aristophanes represents him as pleading the causes of poor persons before the *dikasteries*, if Mr. Grote's inference from a passage in “*The Frogs*” can be allowed. On the whole, Cleon seems to have agreed with Cicero's short

description;—*turbulentum quidem civem, sed tamen eloquentem.*

A large part of Mr. Grote's seventh volume is filled with a detailed account of the Sicilian expedition. The failure of that enterprise is ascribed to the utter incapacity and inaction of Nicias, to whom the sole direction of affairs was left, upon the death of Lamachus and the arrest and flight of Alcibiades. In the eighth volume, after the closing scenes of the Peloponnesian war, the capture, subjugation, and liberation of Athens, we have a long and able review of the life and philosophy of Socrates. From this we shall attempt no extracts in the small space remaining to us; indeed, it would be impossible to do the chapter justice by quotations. Mr. Grote's whole account of Greek philosophy, beginning with the Ionic school of Thales, is one of the most valuable portions of his work, and it will be especially so, when enriched by the review of Plato and Aristotle, promised for the twelfth volume. We should not omit, in this connection, the argument for the Athenian Sophists, who, after bearing the accumulated abuse and malediction of more than twenty centuries, have at last found an able champion. We quote the following passage, which Mr. Grote himself cites from the "Quarterly Review," as containing the general drift of his remarks on the Sophists.

"According to Mr. Grote, they were regular teachers of Greek morality, neither above nor below the standard of the age. According to the common view, Socrates was the great opponent of the Sophists, and Plato his natural successor in the same combat. According to Mr. Grote, Socrates was the great representative of the Sophists, distinguished from them only by his higher eminence, and by the peculiarity of his life and teaching. According to the common view, Plato and his followers were the authorized teachers, *the established clergy* of the Greek nation,—and the Sophists the dissenters. According to Mr. Grote, the Sophists were the *established clergy*, and Plato was the *dissenter*,—the Socialist, who attacked the Sophists (as he attacked the poets and the statesmen), not as a particular sect, but as one of the existing orders of society."—See Grote, Vol. VIII. p. 549, note 2, 2d ed.

The ninth volume contains the expedition of Cyrus, and a continuation of the affairs of Greece and the operations in

Asia Minor down to the peace of Antalcidas. In the tenth, we come at last to Epaminondas.

"Scarcely any character in Grecian history," says Mr. Grote, "has been judged with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of admiration, — from all, sincere and hearty, from some, enthusiastic. Cicero pronounces him to be the first man in Greece." — Vol. X. p. 483.

"Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we find the like many-sided excellence: for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both, — and the remark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence, — that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them, — trained to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects than came before the public assembly, — familiarized with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained." — Vol. X. p. 491.

We must here conclude our extracts from Mr. Grote. His eleventh volume has not been noticed, as it seems to be incomplete without its successor. The life of Demosthenes is left unfinished, and but one of the men of Macedon has appeared upon the stage. We may remark, that the limits which, for historical reasons, Mr. Grote has assigned to his work, are also peculiarly adapted to increase its dramatic interest. On one side we have the "Grecian foretime," interwoven with its wreath of poetry and legend, as it came from the poet's hand; on the other side, we are to conclude with the generation of Alexander, with which our peculiar interest in Greek history ceases, and with which the drama is brought to an appropriate close in a scene of fatal splendor.

That Mr. Grote's History is faultless, no one will pretend; that it will in due time be superseded, is only the natural consequence of the advance of human wisdom; but the varied learning and the eminent ability which have been bestowed upon these volumes render their publication an important era in the history of Grecian research.